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Abstract—As part of network security testing, an 
administrator needs to know whether the firewall 
enforces the security policy as expected or not. In 
this setting, black-box testing and evaluation 
methodologies can be helpful. In this paper, we 
employ a simple mutation operation, namely 
flipping a bit, to generate mutant firewall policies 
and use them to evaluate our previously proposed 
weighted test case selection method for firewall 
testing. In the previously proposed firewall testing 
approach, abstract test cases that are automatically 
generated from firewall decision diagrams are 
instantiated by selecting test input values from 
different test data pools for each field of firewall 
policy. Furthermore, a case study is presented to 
validate the proposed approach. 
 
Keywords-testing; firewalls; firewall testing; mutation 
analysis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Firewalls have to be tested to validate that they 
work as specified. The main focus of our firewall 
testing approach is the intended security policy. The 
intended security policy consists of firewall rules 
configuring the firewall behavior. The security policy 
is external to the firewall like a configuration file. 
In this paper, firewall policy is represented by 
firewall decision diagram (FDD) and abstract test cases 
are generated through path coverage using decision 
paths on the FDD.  Instantiation of abstract test cases 
with test values, which are selected based on priorities 
and weights using a feedback control approach, is 
presented in our previous paper [1]. The test values 
with high priorities are assumed to have high 
probability to reveal mismatches between firewall’s 
expected and executed behavior. Weights are used to 
alternate among high priority test values. 
In this paper, we employ a simple mutation 
operation, namely flipping a bit, to generate mutant 
firewall policies. Although there are a few studies on 
mutating specifications and using them to evaluate test 
sets [2],[3],[4], to the authors’ knowledge there is only 
one study [5] where mutating firewall policies for the 
evaluation of security test sets is proposed.  
The novelty of the approach presented in this paper 
is to use flipping a bit as a mutation operator to mutate 
specifications, where we consider firewall policy as a 
special case of dynamic specifications. The flipping a 
bit mutation operation is developed specifically for 
firewall policies. The decision made and action taken 
by the firewall is either accept or deny, which can be 
represented by one bit. A slight change can be obtained 
by flipping one bit, which means if the action field of a 
rule in the original policy is accept, its corresponding 
mutant policy will have a rule with deny action and 
vice versa. The flipping a bit mutation operator is a 
variation of other logic-based mutation operators. 
For the generation of mutant policies, we follow 
table coverage criteria suggested by Ammann and 
Black [2], whereas Hwang et al. [5] used rule coverage 
criterion, predicate coverage criterion and clause 
coverage criterion. The firewall policy is placed in a 
table, where each rule is a row and each field of a rule 
is a column. We use mutated policies to evaluate the 
test set generated using our proposed weighted test 
selection method.  
Next section summarizes related work before 
Section III outlines the preliminaries required for the 
proposed approach. Section IV presents our feedback 
control based test case instantiation approach for 
firewall testing. The core of the paper, Section V, 
explains the proposed mutation based evaluation 
approach for test sets generated for firewall testing. 
The tool developed for the mutation based evaluation 
of firewall test sets is presented in Section VI. Section 
VII presents the case study we carried out to exemplify 
the proposed approach. Section VIII concludes the 
paper and outlines future work planned. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
This paper focuses on firewall implementation 
testing considering only policy execution. There is one 
approach to firewall implementation testing by Senn et 
al. [6], who have worked on firewall implementation 
testing using protocol finite state automata to generate 
abstract test cases through unique input/output 
sequences [7] and instantiate abstract test cases with 
test tuples consisting of  
<protocol>, <srcIP>, <dstIP>, <action> 
fields of a firewall policy rule. However, in our work 
abstract test cases are generated from FDD and 
concrete test cases are built using  
<protocol>, <srcIP>, <srcPort>, <dstIP>, <dstPort>, <action> 
fields of a firewall rule. 
An approach to specification-based test generation 
for security-critical systems is proposed by Wimmel 
and Jürjens [8]. Although not directly related, in their 
work, the test sequences are determined with respect to 
the security properties required by the system, using 
mutations of the system specification. They also 
followed the abstract test case generation approach, 
however the concretization of abstract test cases apply 
only to an existing implementation. 
Hwang et al. [5] utilized two test case generation 
method, one is based on local constraint solving and 
the other one based on global constraint solving, in 
addition to random test case generation, whereas we 
employed our weighted test selection method in 
addition to random test case generation. 
In this work, we use FDD [9] notion for modeling, 
whereas in our previous work [10], we used directed 
acyclic graph concept to deal with rule dependencies, 
which is implicitly handled by FDD. The present paper 
chooses FDD notation since formal, graph-theoretical 
notions and algorithms are utilized intensively with it. 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
The firewall testing process starts with the 
generation of FDD from firewall policy, of which 
preliminaries are explained in Section III-A. The 
firewall testing process continues with the generation 
of abstract test cases and their instantiation with test 
input values to obtain concrete test cases, of which 
preliminaries are given in Section III-B. Since the goal 
of this paper is to use mutation analysis for the 
evaluation of firewall test sets, the selected test set 
generation approach for the case study, which is our 
previously proposed weighted test case selection 
method [1], is therefore explained in detail in Section 
IV. 
 Concrete test cases are converted to network test 
packets and injected to the firewall under 
consideration. The packets passing the firewall are 
collected to determine the result of test cases. The test 
set evaluation is performed using mutation analysis, of 
which preliminaries are mentioned in Section III-C and 
mutation-based evaluation of test sets for firewall 
testing is explained in detail in Section V. 
A.  Firewall Decision Diagram Generation 
While testing firewalls with respect to intended 
security policy, a model of the firewall policy helps to 
predict and control its behavior. FDDs are chosen to 
model the firewall policy. 
A firewall decision diagram f (or FDD f, for short) 
over the fields F0, · · · , Fn1 is an acyclic and directed 
graph [14], where a field Fi is a variable whose value is 
taken from a predefined interval of nonnegative 
integers. An FDD f over the fields F0, · · · , Fn1 can be 
represented by a sequence of rules, each of which is of 
the form 
F0  S0  · · ·  Fn1  Sn1  <decision> 
such that the following two conditions hold [9]. First, 
each rule in the sequence represents a distinct decision 
path in f. Second, each decision path in f is represented 
by a distinct rule in the sequence. Note that the order of 
the rules in the sequence is immaterial. The algorithm 
to generate a FDD is presented in [9]. 
B.  Test Case Generation for Firewalls 
Our test case generation approach consists of two 
parts. First, we generate abstract test cases. Abstract 
test cases are produced to test the correct policy 
handling of a firewall. Second, test input values are 
collected from various sources such as; firewall policy, 
domain topology knowledge, and black-lists. To obtain 
the concrete test cases, we instantiate abstract test cases 
with test input values. 
The sequence of firewall rules is converted to a 
FDD as described in [9], which is then used for test 
generation. Each decision path in the FDD represents 
an abstract test case. We select to abstract a firewall 
rule as  
IF  (<protocol>, <srcIP>, <srcPort>, <dstIP>, <dstPort>)  
THEN  <action>,  
where protocol is a network protocol, such as TCP or 
UDP, and action is either ACCEPT or DENY. The root 
node of a FDD represents the protocol field, and the 
terminal nodes represent the action field, intermediate 
nodes represent other fields respectively. Every 
decision path starting at the root and ending at a 
terminal node represents a rule in the policy.  
In our previous paper [1], we choose the expert 
knowledge approach to construct test input values. 
Although more costly, test input values selected using 
expert knowledge is assumed to reveal more errors 
than the other two approaches. Moreover, expert 
knowledge can prioritize test input values, which is the 
default feature of our approach. Sets of test input 
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values should be prepared beforehand to be used in the 
instantiation of the abstract test cases. Although the 
number of sets may vary from expert to expert, we 
decide to utilize three sets for each of the following 
fields:  src_IP, dst_IP, and dst_port. We increased the 
number of the sets proposed in [1]. In this paper, we 
employed four sets, which are given in Table I.  
 
TABLE I. Sets of Test Input Values  
Field Src_IP Dst_IP Dst_port 
Set1 blacklist_adm
in 
current_domain
_addresses 
listening_port
s 
Set2 blacklist_3rdp
arty 
past_domain_ad
dresses 
vulnerable_ 
ports 
Set3 past_traffic_ 
addresses 
past_traffic_ 
addresses 
past_traffic_ 
ports 
Set4 policy_addres
ses 
policy_addresse
s 
policy_ports 
 
Finally, we instantiate the abstract test cases with 
the test input data to obtain concrete test cases. Once 
the concrete test cases are generated, they are 
converted to network packets and injected to firewall, 
where the evaluation is performed using firewall 
testing architecture as explained in [1]. 
C.  Mutation-Based Test Set Evaluation 
Mutation testing is a fault-based testing technique 
providing a mutation adequacy score, which can be 
used to measure the effectiveness of a test set in terms 
of its ability to detect faults [11]. The hypothesis 
behind mutation testing is that the faults introduced by 
mutation testing represent the mistakes that 
programmers often make. A mutation operator creates 
a slight change [12] in the corresponding context, 
which can be a program, a specification, or a policy in 
our case. A slightly changed program is called a 
mutant. To evaluate the quality of a given test set, each 
mutant is executed against the test set. If the result of 
running a mutant is different from the result of running 
the original program for any test cases in the test set, 
the seeded fault denoted by the mutant is detected [11]. 
The detection ratio, called mutation score, is used to 
assess the quality of the test set. 
Since most coverage metrics apply to source code, 
it is difficult to utilize them in cases of conformance 
testing [2]. Security testing, a kind of conformance 
testing, is performed with respect to a security policy.  
Therefore, an approach which evaluates security test 
sets independent of code is necessary. Ammann and 
Black [2] developed a specification-based coverage 
metric to evaluate test sets. We follow their approach 
and apply it to security policies. Instead of specifica-
tion mutants, we generate policy mutants using a 
mutation operator, which we call flipping a bit. Then 
we evaluate firewall test set for mutation adequacy. 
The mutation score for a test set is the percentage of 
non-equivalent mutants killed by that test set. A test set 
is called mutation adequate if its mutation score is 
100% [13]. 
IV. WEIGHTED TEST CASE SELECTION 
For the instantiation of abstract test cases, we 
proposed feedback control based approach to select test 
input values [1]. The field values that have higher 
potential to reveal errors should be selected more often 
than others. In order to facilitate this idea, priorities 
should be stored along with field values in the sets of 
test input values and used in the selection process. 
Moreover, the sets should have dynamic weights so 
that alternating among sets is possible. The proposed 
approach is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The controller is responsible for the determination 
of next weight vector (wv), which is composed of n 
weight values, where n is the total number of sets of 
test input values. A weight value is a real number and 
it is initially equal to 1. The controller, remembering 
the current weight vector and using the feedback, 
namely the identity (ID) of selected set, determines the 
next weight vector using Equations (1) and (2). 
wvi(k+1) = wvi(k) - wap if i is the ID of selected set   (1) 
wvj(k+1) = wvj(k) + (wap/n-1) for all j not equal to i  (2) 
where wvi(k+1) is the the ith element of the weight 
vector at step k+1 and weight alternate percentage 
(wap) is a real number in (0,1). When there is a test 
value request, the selector chooses a test input value 
from the sets using the (setID,elementID) information 
that comes from the intensity calculator. The intensity 
calculator stores a priority vector (pv), which is 
composed of priorities of all elements of all sets.  
pv = (p11, p12,…,p1i,p21, p22,…,p2j,…,pn1, pn2,…, pnk)  (3) 
The size of the priority vector is the total number of 
elements of all sets. For instance, assuming that each 
set given in Table I has three elements, the size of the 
priority vector is nine. The intensity vector (iv) is 
obtained by normalizing the priorities, which is 
achieved by dividing each priority to the sum of all 
priorities (Σp).  
iv = (i11, i12,…,i1i,i21, i22,…,i2j,…,in1, in2,…, ink)           (4) 
where ijk = pjk / Σp. 
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Figure 1. Schematic Working of Feedback Control based Approach to Select Test Input Values [1]. 
 
The weighted intensity vector (wiv) is calculated by 
the scalar multiplication of the intensity vector with 
expanded weight vector (ewv), where expanded weight 
vector is composed of element weights that have their 
set weights. 
wiv = iv • ewv                                                             (5) 
The selected test value is the one where weighted 
intensity is the maximum of all weighted intensities. 
The intensity calculator passes the (setID, elementID) 
information of the maximum weighted intensity to the 
selector, which returns the corresponding test input 
value to the requestor. 
For illustration purposes, an example is given in 
Table II. In this example, there are three sets of test 
input values, each having two elements and their 
priorities are presented in the priority vector. Using (4) 
and (5), weighted intensity of each element is 
calculated and presented in the weighted intensity 
vector. The element that has the highest weighted 
intensity is selected as the test value input for that step. 
At the next step, the weight of its set is reduced by 
the controller using wap. Additionally, the priority of 
the selected element is decremented by the intensity 
calculator using deprioritization constant (dc), which is 
used to lower the priority of an element so that other 
elements will have a better chance to be selected. The 
algorithm for feedback control based selection of test 
input values is given in [1]. 
The feedback control based selection should be 
performed separately for each field in the abstract test 
case. We suggest that test input values for the Protocol, 
Src_IP, Dest_IP, Dest_port fields should be selected 
for firewall testing. 
V. MUTATION-BASED EVALUATION OF TEST 
SETS FOR FIREWALL TESTING 
A coverage metric independent of implementation 
is necessary to evaluate test sets generated for firewall 
testing. In this paper, a mutation-based policy coverage 
metric is presented analogous to specification coverage 
metric suggested by Ammann and Black [2]. Although 
the general idea is similar, our approach differs from 
theirs in the following points: 
• We apply mutations to firewall policies, which 
are simple logic formulae, whereas they apply 
mutations to temporal logic formulae, which are 
more general. 
• We use flipping a bit mutation whereas they 
employed replace constant, replace operator, 
replace variable, and remove expression 
mutations.  
• We use policy decision point [14], which is an 
engine that makes accept/deny decisions based on 
a set of policies, whereas they utilized model 
checker to execute test cases. 
The calculation of mutation-based policy coverage 
metric for a policy and test set is shown in Fig. 2. First, 
mutant policies (MPs) are generated using a mutation 
method (M) from the original firewall policy (P). A 
generated mutant policy is not accepted as a valid MP 
(VMP) if it is same with P.  
 
 
 
TABLE II. Test Input Value Selection Example using Feedback Control based Selection [1]. 
Weight Vector Priority Vector Weighted Intensity Vector Selected 
Set Step w1 w2 w3 A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 wiA1 wiA2 wiB1 wiB2 wiC1 wiC2 MAX 
1 1,00 1,00 1,00 5 5 8 4 5 2 0,14 0,14 0,22 0,08 0,14 0,05 0,22 2 
2 1,05 0,90 1,05 5 5 7 4 5 2 0,15 0,15 0,18 0,08 0,15 0,06 0,18 2 
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 Figure 2. Calculation of Mutation-Based Policy Coverage. 
 
The test set (TS) is executed on VMPs at the policy 
decision point. Mutation-based policy coverage metric 
is mutation score (MS), which is the number of MPs 
killed (KMPs) by TS divided by the total number of 
VMPs. 
 
MS( P , TS , M ) = # of KMPs / # of VMPs                   (6) 
 
The flipping a bit mutation method is developed 
specifically for firewall policies. The decision made 
and action taken by the firewall is either accept or 
deny, which can be represented by one bit. If the 
necessary condition explained below occurs, then the 
slight change can be obtained by flipping one bit, 
which means if the action field of a rule in the original 
policy is accept, its corresponding mutant policy will 
have a rule with deny action and vice versa. 
One of the important questions in mutant generation 
is when to stop generating mutants. We follow table 
coverage criteria in our mutant policy generation 
algorithm. A policy can be represented as a table. The 
number of rows is equal to the number of rules in the 
policy and the number of columns is always equal to 
six. We generate a mutant policy for each cell of the 
policy table. If we take the policy of the case study as 
an example, our algorithm will generate 21* 6 = 126 
mutant policies. 
A mutant policy is generated depending on the 
value of each cell in the policy table. The function 
create_mutant copies all the rules of the original policy 
except the current rule and changes the current rule 
depending on the corresponding cell value.  
The value of first cell in the current rule is changed 
to another protocol and values of the remaining cells 
are copied. The last argument of create_mutant 
function indicates whether to apply the mutation 
operator to the action cell or not. A FALSE value 
means “do not apply”, whereas a TRUE value means 
“do apply”.  
If the value of second cell or fourth cell in the 
current rule is a concrete IP address, then a value from 
complementing address space is selected randomly and 
mutation operator is not applied to action cell. If the 
value of second cell or fourth cell in the current rule is 
an IP address range, then an address is selected 
randomly from that range and mutation operator is 
applied to action cell. 
If the value of third cell or fifth cell in the current 
rule is a concrete port value, then a value from 
complementing port space is selected randomly and 
mutation operator is not applied to action cell. If the 
value of third cell or fifth cell in the current rule is a 
port range, then a value from that port range is selected 
randomly and mutation operator is applied to action 
cell. 
Mutation operator is applied to the sixth cell. After 
mutant creation for each cell, the resulting mutant 
policy is compared with the original policy. If they are 
the same policy, then the created mutant policy 
becomes an invalid mutant policy to be discarded, thus 
nil is returned. If they are different, then mutant policy 
returned from create_mutant function. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND TOOL SUPPORT 
For the implementation of our approach explained 
in Section IV and V, we developed a mutation analysis 
tool called TG Firewall Testing Suite (TGFTS) in Java 
for firewall testing. As a mutation analysis tool 
working on firewall policies, TGFTS first creates 
mutant policies from the original firewall policy using 
only one mutation operation, flipping a bit. Each 
created mutant has a slight change from the original 
policy. The Policies tabbed pane creates and lists all 
the mutant policies. The user is able to check the 
content of each mutant policy. 
The Test Cases tabbed pane enables users to 
generate test cases either using the weighted selection 
method explained in Section IV or randomly. All the 
parameters are entered in this pane. After test cases are 
generated, they are listed with field values. The Results 
tabbed pane shows mutant policies versus test cases 
matrix. Which test case kills which mutant policy can 
be found out in this matrix. 
The last tabbed pane of TGFTS is called Mutation 
Analysis pane and shown in Fig. 3. This pane is used to 
list killed mutant policies, the test case that killed the 
mutant and the rule of the mutant policies that the test 
case fails. As seen from the figure, number of test 
cases, number of mutant policies, number of invalid 
mutant policies, number of killed mutants, and 
calculated mutation score are presented at the top of 
Mutation Analysis tabbed pane. 
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 Figure 3. TG Firewall Testing Suite, Mutation Analysis Pane. 
 
VII. CASE STUDY 
The policy of the firewall is considered as a 
specification. Therefore, the firewall testing context in 
this paper is specification based testing, where the 
operation of FUT or implementation of its policy is 
checked with respect to its specified policy, i.e. 
expected behavior. Once the firewall policy is 
determined, it is loaded to the firewall and the firewall 
is started. It should be noted that the loaded firewall 
policy on the FUT can be changed externally after 
starting the firewall. In that case, firewalls require 
restart. When that happens, we assume that the 
specified policy does not match the implemented 
policy and if there is a mismatch it should be 
identified. Firewall testing is one of the approaches to 
identify such a mismatch. Moreover, the firewall 
software and/or hardware may not behave as expected. 
The unexpected behavior can also be uncovered by 
using the firewall testing approach stated in this paper, 
which is another merit of the proposition. 
A.  Firewall Policy Under Consideration 
The firewall policy under consideration (PUC) for 
the case study is taken from a firewall, which protects a 
research laboratory in our university. Some of the IP 
addresses are sanitized for security reasons. Then the 
policy is converted to a FDD, which is presented in 
Fig. 4. Using FDD, abstract test cases can be generated 
by traversing all paths so that path coverage criteria is 
satisfied. For the right outmost path of the FDD given 
in Fig. 4, the abstract test case is as follows: 
 
Test Input Protocol tcp 
Test Input Src_IP [192.168.0.0-192.168.255.255] 
Test Input Dst_IP 120.130.140.100 
Test Input Dst_port 20,21,22,80,110,143,443,465, 
993,995,[10000-10003] 
Expected Output Action accept 
 
To instantiate concrete test cases for this abstract 
test case, test input values should be selected for all 
fields. The sets of test input values similar to sets given 
in Table I are determined prior to test input value 
selection process and employed by our weight based 
test case selection approach. The test input values for 
all fields are selected using the proposed weight based 
selection algorithm with initial-weight=100, wap=0.1 
and dc=0.1 values. 
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Figure 4. FDD of the Firewall Policy used for Case Study. 
 
For definitive fields, such as Protocol and Dst_IP, 
the values in the abstract test case are utilized. For 
Src_port field, which does not occur in the abstract 
case because it is not in the FDD, a random number 
generator is employed to generate related test value. 
After a test case is put together using selected test input 
values, it is checked for uniqueness. If it exists in the 
test set, it is discarded and a new test case is formed. 
After the composition of concrete test cases, network 
packets are generated from concrete test cases, injected 
to the network and test results are evaluated. 
B.  Results and Discussion 
The PUC for the case study has 21 rules. We 
generate 126 mutant policies from PUC using mutant 
policy generation method explained in Section V. One 
of these mutant policies is consistent with the original 
PUC, therefore counted as invalid mutant policy. 
The test input values for all fields are selected using 
the weight based selection algorithm with initial-
weight=100, wap=0.1 and dc=0.1 values and five test 
sets, called WTSi, containing 50, 100, 150, 200, and 
250 test cases are generated. Each test set starts with 
test cases from the preceding test set and adds 50 more 
test cases to the end. This way, we are able to observe 
the slope of increase in mutation score. The mutation 
scores obtained for each weight based selected test set 
is illustrated in Fig. 5. 
Moreover, another five test sets, called RTSi, 
containing 50, 100, 150, 200, and 250 test cases are 
generated randomly. We use the mutation scores of 
these random generated test sets as a baseline. The 
mutation scores obtained for each random generated 
test set is illustrated in Fig. 5 as well. 
There are two limitations to be considered with 
higher number of test cases. One is the limitation 
introduced by our weighted test case selection 
approach. The maximum number of test cases to be 
generated is bounded by the initial weight and the 
number of elements existing in the sets of test input 
values.  
Second limitation comes from software operational 
profile modeling research, which shows that after a 
certain point randomly generated test cases 
outperforms any other test case generation approach 
[15]. However, that certain point depends on the 
operational profile of the software and may be 
computationally infeasible.  
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 Figure 5. Mutation Scores of WTS and RTS sets. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
To evaluate our weighted test case selection and 
generation approach for firewall testing, we choose 
mutation analysis method. In the proposed approach, 
mutant policies are generated from the original firewall 
policy using flipping a bit mutation. The resulting set 
of mutant policies are exercised by five test sets, which 
are generated by our weighted test case selection 
approach and compared with a different five test sets 
that are generated randomly. It is observed that for the 
initial 250 test cases, weighted test case selection and 
generation approach outperforms random test 
generation approach for firewall testing. 
We will be extending the proposed approach by 
employing other mutation operators suitable for 
firewall policies. Then, we would like to compare our 
weighted test case generation approach with adaptive 
random testing and intelligent segmentation testing. 
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